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The NLRA vs. The First Amendment: Which One Helps the Employee Who Loves Social
Media?

Megan Kosovich

Introduction
“I’m not a teacher --- I’m a warden for future criminals! They had a scared straight
program in school --- why couldn’t i [sic] bring 1st graders?1” In March 2011 Jennifer O’Brien, a
first grade school teacher in Patterson, New Jersey, posted this comment on her Facebook page
commenting on her class and a program the school held for other students. While the audience
of O’Brien’s comment may have only been intended for a few “friends,” the actual audience was
anything but.2 National news networks reported on the comment while parents and community
organizers protested the behavior of the teacher.3 Soon after the comment was made, O’Brien
was suspended without pay, and administrative law proceedings commenced thereafter to
determine whether probable cause existed to warrant her dismissal from her tenured position.4
Viki Knox, a teacher in Union, New Jersey, faced a similar fate as O’Brien when she
posted a comment expressing her opinion concerning a display the high school devoted to the

1

Matter of Tenure Hearing (O’Brien), OAL DKT EDU 05600-1, 2011 WL 5429055, at *1 (N.J.
Admin Oct. 28 2011).
2
See Id. at *2; Joe Green, Judge Rules Paterson, N.J. Teacher Jennifer O’Brien Can be Fired for
Facebook Comments, NEWSROOM JERSEY (Nov. 10, 2011),
http://www.newjerseynewsroom.com/state/judge-rules-paterson-nj-teacher-jennifer-obrien-canbe-fired-for-facebook-comments.
3
Id. at *3.
4
Id. at *1.
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Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transgender History Month.5 Similar incidents of employees posting
comments that spark a firestorm of debate among the public community have also been reported
across the country, and while some employers have responded with appropriate social media
policies, this new area of law ignites debate over the constitutional and labor rights of employees
in general.6
This paper attempts to address this new area of social media output and federal
employment law. Should employees be subject to discipline for what they say on Facebook?
What are the potential free speech implications for taking action against what employees say
after hours, and for what is only intended to be said among a few “friends?” This paper will then
address what other potential labor issues a private employer can face if they fire an employee for
what he or she says on a social media site. Finally, this paper will compare and contrast private
employees’ rights with public employees’ rights to determine which employees’ speech is
protected more.
To answer these questions this paper will first review the free speech laws in the
employment context. It will then address the private and public employment distinction in the
law, and how the distinction affects employees in their social media interactions. Finally, this
paper will examine how private employees have tackled social media problems, and compare

5

Bob Considline and Jessica Calefati, School Board Files Tenure Charges Against N.J. Teacher
Who Made Anti-Gay Comments on Facebook, N.J.COM (Jan. 12, 2012),
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2012/01/school_board_files_tenure_char.html (Knox posted,
“Why parade your unnatural immoral behaviors before the rest of us?... I DO NOT HAVE TO
TOLERATE ANYTHING OTHERS WISH TO DO. I DO HAVE TO LOVE AND SPEAK
AND DO WHAT’S RIGHT!”).
6
NJEA Members: Tips for Twitter and Facebook, NJEA,
http://www.njea.org/resources/~/link.aspx?_id=C7C0D97FC1D74C6D9B918E6BA12A87BF&_
z=z
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which approach, the private approach or the public approach, better protects employees’ speech
on Facebook.
A. General Free Speech Overview
1. Public Employment
While the First Amendment explicitly states that “Congress shall make no law…
abridging the freedom of speech,” the protections of the First Amendment are in no way absolute,
especially in the context of employment.7 Generally speaking, “employees have the right to
speak on matters of public concern.”8 To determine when an employee’s right can be enforced
against adverse employment actions, the Supreme Court conducts a balancing test taking into
account both the State’s interest as an employer and the employee’s First Amendment
protections.9
“[T]he State has interest as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees
that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of
the speech of the citizenry in general. The problem in any case is to arrive at a
balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon
matters of public concern and the interest of the state, as an employer, in
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees.”10
This Pickering balancing approach has been refined and applied by the Supreme Court in a two
pronged analysis articulated in Connick v. Myers.11 First, the Court analyses whether the speech

7

U.S. CONST. amend I; see City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80 (2004) (holding that the
State employer can “impose certain restraints on the speech of its employees, restraints that
would be unconstitutional if applied to the general public[;]” see Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Tp.
High School Dist. 205, Will County, Ill., 391 U.S. 563, 568-69 (1968); see also, Waters v.
Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1993).
8
City of San Diego, Cal. v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80 (2004).
9
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568;
10
Id.
11
Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983).
3

at issue can be “fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern.”12 If
the speech at issue is not characterized as such, then the Court does not need to examine the
adverse employment action taken by the employer under free speech grounds.13 The Court
reasoned that this characterization test is necessary in order to prevent a flood of constitutional
challenges taken anytime that a state employee was disciplined for what he or she said. 14
If the speech at issue does touch “upon a matter of public concern,” and the speech
contributed to an adverse employment action, the Court must then “reach the most appropriate
possible balance of the competing interests,” those being that of the employee’s free speech
interest with the “government’s interest in the effective and efficient fulfillment of its
responsibilities to the public.”15
While not addressing social media output, the Supreme Court stated that the second step
in the public employee free speech balancing test is only applied “when the employee speaks as a
citizen upon matters of public concern rather than as an employee upon matters only of personal
interest.”16 Determining whether speech is a “matter of public concern” in the social media age
can potentially prove problematic.17 Courts must determine whether an employee who uses

12

Id.
Connick, 461 U.S. at 146 (“When employee expression cannot be fairly considered as relating
to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community, government official should
enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the
name of the First Amendment.”
14
Id. at 149. (“To presume that all matters which transpire within a government office are of
public concern would mean that virtually every remark- and certainly ever criticism directed at a
public official- would plant the seed of a constitutional case…the First Amendment does not
require a pulic office to be run as a roundtable for employee complaints over internal office
affairs.”)
15
Id. at 150-51.
16
City of San Diego, 543 U.S. at 83 (2004).
17
See Matter of Tenure Hearing (O’Brien), OAL DKT EDU 05600-1, 2011 WL 5429055, at *2
(Determining that O’Brien “took a legitimate issue of public concern ‘and distorted [it] into a
vehicle’ to let her more than 300 Facebook ‘friends’ know she was having a bad time at work.”)
13
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social media is truly expressing a matter of public concern when they do so, or rather, if they are
“distorting” matters of concern into a “vehicle” to complain about work.18 Courts arguably have
the most difficult time determining whether this aspect of the Connick analysis has been met.19
In City of San Diego the Supreme Court had to address whether a police officer’s sexual
videos sold online were “matters of public concern” and if so, whether he could be fired from his
state employment.20 The police officer in City of San Diego was fired because he sold videos of
himself stripping in a police uniform, and he also had an online forum where he sold official
police uniforms, and other official police equipment of the San Diego Police Department.21 The
Court outlined the reasons for protecting State employees’ First Amendment rights, stating,
“public employees are often the members of the community who are likely to have informed
opinions as to the operations of their public employers, operations which are of substantial
concern to the public. Were they not able to speak on these matters, the community would be
deprived of informed opinions on important public issue.”22 The Court focused on the interest of
the public in allowing public employees to speak on important issues, reasoning that “[t]he
interest at stake is as much the public’s interest in receiving informed opinion as it is the
employee’s own right to disseminate it.”23
Determining what speech qualifies for protection, the Court examined “the ‘content, form,
and context of a given statement, as reveled by the whole record.’”24 Examples of speech that the

18

Id.
See Elizabeth J. Bohn, Put on Your Coat, A Chill Wind Blows: Embracing the Expansion of
the Adverse Employment Action Factor in Tenth Circuit First Amendment Retaliation Claims. 83
DENV. U. L. REV. 867, 869 (2006).
20
City of San Diego, 543 U.S. at 78.
21
Id. at 78.
22
Id. at 83.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 83 (citing Connick, 461 U.S., at 146-47.)
19
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Court gave that are “matters of public concern” included comments about the President of the
United States, and statements that are the “subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of
general interest and of value and concern to the public at the time of publication.”25 In City of
San Diego, the Court found that sexual videos being sold online were not matters of public
interest and no balancing of the interests was necessary.26
While the actual speech at issue in City of San Diego was not a Facebook post, it was a
form of Internet communication engaged in during off-work hours.27 So while employees may
not be on the clock when they are posting status updates on Facebook, they can still be held
accountable by their employers for what they say online, if what they say does not fall into a
“matter of public concern.” However, even if what a public employee says online can qualify as
a “matter of public concern,” the government employer’s interest may be so great, that it can
overcome the constitutional interests of the employee.28
In the school context, courts are hesitant to protect the free speech of a teacher when the
comments made by the teacher have interfered with the purpose of a school.29 The O’Brien
court rejected the argument that the speech at issue was a matter of public concern, however, the
court held that even if the speech was a matter of public concern, the State’s interest would still
prevail because of the setting the employee worked in. What can be derived from this particular
case is that the public employee may have more or less restraints on his or her free speech
protections depending on the type of position they serve for the state.
25

Id. at 83-84
Id. at 84.
27
Id. at 78.
28
See Matter of Tenure Hearing (O’Brien), OAL DKT EDU 05600-1, 2011 WL 5429055, at *23 (While the Court ultimately held that the employees comments were not matters of public
concern, they still engaged in a Pickering analysis, holding that the employers interest
outweighed the interests of the employee.)
29
See generally, id.
26
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For schools, the O’Brien court stated that “restraints on speech have particular
applicability in a school setting, where a teacher, like O’Brien, is responsible for nurturing young
children, and must work in concert with administrators, parents and the community at large to
promote student success.”30 The importance of the school setting in the determination of free
speech infringements is also seen by the deference courts give to the findings of the arbitrators.31
In some states, like New York, great deference is given to the findings of arbitrators in
determining whether free speech rights have been violated. There, courts will not even examine
the free speech arguments if the hearing officers determine that the comments were not a matter
of public concern.32
In different contexts however, courts may not give the same deference as they would for
a school.33 In Mattingly, the Eastern District of Arkansas held that an employee’s complaints34
about the firing of other co-workers in the Circuit Clerk’s office were matters of public concern.
Even though multiple phone calls were made by the public to the Circuit Clerk’s office
criticizing the Clerk for firing employees, the court found that the posts did not “‘adversely
affect[] the efficiency of the Circuit Clerks office.’”35 No special weight was given to the Circuit
Clerk’s office in the Mattingly opinion so as to allow for the employer to justify the firing in
relation to a Facebook post.
While not about social media output, in Rankin v. McPherson, the Supreme Court held
that when “an employee serves no confidential, policymaking, or public contract role, the danger
30

Id.
See Rubino v. City of New York, No. 107292/11, 2012 WL 373101, at *5 (N.Y. Gen. Term Feb.
1, 2012).
32
See Id.
33
See Mattingly v. Milligan, 4:11CV00215 JLH, 2011 WL 5184283 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 1, 2011).
34
Id. at *2. (Employee posted after co-workers were fired, “my heart goes out to the ladies that
were told by letter they were no longer needed… It’s sad”).
35
Id. at *4 (quoting Shockency v. Ramsey Cnty, 493 F.3d 941, 949 (8th Cir. 2007).
31

7

to the agency’s successful functioning from that employee’s private speech is minimal.”36 The
Court went further and stated that “[w]e cannot believe that every employee in [the law
enforcement] office, whether computer operator, electrician, or file clerk, is equally required, on
pain of discharge, to avoid any statement susceptible of being interpreted by the Constable as an
individual that the employee may be unworthy of employment in his law enforcement agency.”37
McPherson explains that it is not only the actual place of work that is taken into account when
examining the employer’s interest for the purposes of Pickering, but the type of work the
employee at issue performs. A teacher, therefore, may be restricted from what he or she says
online, more so than another employer, like the office clerk in McPherson. This does however,
create some discrepancies as to how to apply the balancing test concerning social networking
sites.38
2. The Public and Private Employment Distinction
The First Amendment protects individuals from government infringements.39 Generally
speaking the First Amendment does not protect against private employers adverse employment
actions taken against employees for things said on social media sites.
In the private sphere, employees do not enjoy the same First Amendment protections that
many public employees enjoy. 40 However, the NLRB similarly protects employees who speak

36

483 U.S., 378, 390-91 (1987)
Id. at 391.
38
See Patricia M. Nidiffer. Tinkering with Restrictions on Educator Speech: Can School Boards
Restrict What Educators Say on Social Networking Sites?, 36 U. DAYTON L. REV. 115, 129
(2010)
39
U.S. CONST. amend I; See Lloyd Corp., v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972).
37
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out on Facebook about their work, but uses different reasoning than courts use for public
employees.41
B. The National Labor Relations Act and Employee Speech
While private employees may not have the same First Amendment protections against
adverse employment actions as public employees, private employees may use the National Labor
Relations Act as a means to protect what they say off hours on social media sites.42 Public
employees cannot use the NLRA against their public employers because Section 2(2) excludes
“any wholly owned Government Corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State of
Political subdivision thereof” from the protections of the act.43 Section 7 of the NLRA lists the
rights that are guaranteed to employees while section 8(a)(1) declares that employer interferences
with employee Section 7 rights is an unfair labor practice. Included in an employees Section 7
rights is the right “to engage[] in … concerted activities for the collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection.”44 The term “concerted activity” has never been explicitly defined by
congress, and there has been a variety of activity that has been determined to be protected by the
NLRB and the Supreme Court under this term, opening up debate over what the phrase truly
covers.45

41

William C. Martucci, Hiring and Firing in the Facebook Age (with Sample Provisions), Prac.
Law October 2010, at 19, 25 (“Public employers must also be cognizant of First Amendment
limitations on their ability to discipline employees who speak out on matters of public conern.
For private employers, free speech normally is not an issue since the First Amendment only
applies to state action and not to private conduct.”)
42
See Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., 13-CA-46452, 2011 WL 4499437 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges
Sept. 28, 2011).
43
National Labor Relations Act § 2(2), 29 U.S.C. §152(2) (2012)
44
National Labor Relations Act §7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012); National Labor Relations Act § 8,
29 U.S.C.. 160 (2012)
45
See Robert Sprague. Facebook Meets the NLRB: Employee Online Communications and
Unfair Labor Practices, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 957, 959 (2012) (“The term “concerted activities” is
not defined by the NLRA and has been the subject of challenging interpretations and debate.”)
9

After the advent of Facebook and the growth of policies issued by employers restricting
employees’ activities on social media sites, the NLRB has received hundreds of charges by
employees concerning adverse employment actions taken for updates on Facebook, and
employee complaints over their employer handbooks restricting the speech of employees on
social media sites.46 This suggests that the area surrounding private employment, social
networking sites, and employee activity is still unclear with regards to what an employer can and
cannot restrict.47
Some of the debate over what employees post online and whether an employer can take
adverse action against employees surrounds their employer’s social media policy handbook. 48
The General Counsel for the NLRB has found that in cases addressing social medial policies, an
employer can violate section 8(a)(1) of the act if their policy is found to be too broad.49 The
General Counsel articulates that “[a]n employer violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act through the
maintenance of a work rule if that rule would reasonably tend to chill employees in the exercise
of their Section 7 rights.”50 To determine whether a policy or rule will chill an employee’s
Section 7 rights, the Board takes a two-prong approach.51 First the Board determines if the
policy “explicitly restricts Section 7 activity.” Then, if the rule does not restrict Section 7 activity
explicitly, the policy “will violate the Act only upon a showing of one of the following: (1)
employees would reasonably construe the language to prohibit Section 7 activity; (2) the rule

46

See Id. at 957.
See Id. (Employee’s charges over social media activity “raise concerns over the enforcement
of overly broad social media policies by employers.”)
48
See Id. at 966.
49
Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Karen Fernback, Acting
Regional Director of Region 2, Thomas Reuters, No. 02-CA-39682, 2011 WL 6960026, at *5
(Apr. 5, 2011).
50
Id. at 14.
51
Id.
47
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was promulgated in response to union activity; or (3) the rule has been applied to restrict the
exercise of Section 7 rights.”52 The General Counsel has held that policies can still be legal while
the Guidelines associated with the policies can violate Section 7 rights under the two-prong
analysis.
The General Counsel stated that using broad terms like prohibiting “against embarrassing
or disparaging the employer” or restricting comments “that would damage the reputation of the
Employer,” either in the policy portion of the handbook or in the guideline portion of the
handbook, would violate Section 7 rights under the second prong of the two prong approach.53
In approaching a handbook case, the Office of the General Counsel struck down
provisions of an employee hand book that prohibited employees “from using any social media…
that ‘may in any way violate, compromise, or disregard … the rights and reasonable expectations
as to privacy or confidentiality of any person or entity.’”54 In Flagler Hospital, the Office of the
General Counsel also stuck down two more provisions of an employer social media handbook,
that first restricted “‘[a]ny communication or post which constitutes embarrassment, harassment
or defamation of the Hospital’ or of ‘any employee, officer, board member, representative or
staff member,’” and second restricted “‘statements which lack … truthfulness or which might
cause damage to or does damage the reputation or goodwill of the Hospital.’”55 Here the General
Counsel struck down all three provisions as being over broad, however, the General Counsel
gave no guidance as to what an appropriate employee handbook should be. In the context of
employee handbooks, cases like Flagler Hospital provide little guidance to employers who want
52

Id.
Id. at 15.
54
Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Rochelle Kentov, Acting
Regional Director of Region 12, Flagler Hospital, No. 12-CA-27031, 2011 WL 5115074, at *2-3
(May 10, 2011).
55
Id.
53
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to create a comprehensive social media policy for their employees. Even though the cases
provide some help in determining what employers should not say, there is little advice on what
employers can say.
While the cases addressing employer social media policies do not help employers
completely in their ability to restrict their employees’ actions on Facebook, there has been some
guidance provided by the General Counsel in other contexts. The three cases discussed below do
not address the NLRA through an employee handbook analysis, but rather outline how the Board
analyzes Facebook posting in the absence of any employee policy or in the presence of an
unlawful or ambiguous policy.
The Supreme Court has held that an employee can still engage in concerted activity even
if the employee is acting alone.56 Also, the NLRB as well as multiple courts have held that
various amount of activities can be interpreted as “concerted activities” that are protected under
NLRA.57 Such broad interpretations have laid the groundwork for the NLRB to conclude that
social media output can, in certain circumstances, be protected under the NLRA even if there is
no social media policy handbook in place restricting the comments of the employees.58
In Knauz Motors, an employee posted various pictures of events taken at his work place
and then posted comments about the pictures on his Facebook profile.59 In the Board’s ultimate
holding, one set of comments made by the employee was protected under the NLRA while
another set was held to be unprotected. One set of pictures and comments related to a

56

See NLRB v. City Disposal Systems Inc., 465 U.S. 822 (1984)
See i.e. Eastex v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978); see i.e., Timekeeping Systems, Inc., 323 NLRB
244, 249 (1997).
58
See Knauz Motors, 13-CA-4652, 2011 WL 4499437 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Sept. 28, 2011).
59
Id.
57
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promotional event his workplace held while another was of an accident that took place at work.60
The promotional event served food that was dissatisfying to the employee, who stated below a
picture of the event, “The small 8 oz bags of chips, and the $2.00 cookie plate from Sam’s Club,
and the semi fresh apples and oranges were such a nice touch … but to top it all off… the Hot
Dog Cart. Where our clients could attain a over cooked wiener and a stale bun.” There were
multiple other comments made by the employee and others over the series of pictures that the
employee posted online. The second set of posting at issue in the Knauz Motors case dealt with
an accident at work, in which a teenager was allowed behind the wheel of a car and ran over a
customer’s foot. The employee stated, “[t]his is what happens when a sales person sitting in the
front passenger seat … allows a 13 year old boy to get behind the wheel of a 6000 lb. truck …
The kid drives over his father’s foot and into the pond in all about 4 seconds and destroys a
$50,000 truck. OOPS!” Multiple comments were made by “friends” of the employee on
Facebook in connection to this event, including other employees of the company.
The Board addressed both comments made by the employee by first determining whether
the activity at issue was “concerted activity” for the purposes of the NLRA.61 The Board quoted
a Ninth Circuit case to support the conclusion that Facebook comments could be concerted
activity, stating “the ‘activity of a single employee in enlisting the support of his fellow
employees for their mutual aid and protection is as much ‘concerted activity’ as is ordinary
group activity.”62
For the promotional event, the Board noted that it was important that the employee had
previously complained about food being served at the first event at issue, stating, “[t]he lone act

60

Id.
Id.
62
Id. (quoting NLRB v. Mike Yurosek & Son, Inc., 53 F.3d 261, 265 (9th Cir. 1995)).
61
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of a single employee is concerted if it ‘stems from’ or ‘logically grew’ out of prior concerted
activity.” 63 Furthermore, the Board also found that his complaints connected to his wage or
benefits. The Board reasoned, “there may have been customers who were turned off by the food
offerings at the event and either did not purchase a car because of it, or gave the salesperson a
lower rating in the Customer Satisfaction Rating because of it.”64
For the Facebook postings about the car accident, the Board outright rejected any
argument that the posting was concerted activity related to wages or terms of employment. The
posting, according to the Board, did not relate to any discussion the employee ever had with the
employer or other employees. The Board also did not find any connection to the terms and
conditions of employment so as to deserve protection under the NLRA.65
It is also important to note that even if the Facebook activity is “concerted activity” for
the purposes of Section 7 of the NLRA, an employee can still lose the protections of the Act if
the comments “rose ‘to the level of disparagement necessary to deprive otherwise protected
activities”.66 In Knauz Motors, the Board went into an analysis to determine whether the
comments made about the promotional event were characterized in such a way as to lose the
protections of the NLRA. The Board acknowledged that the employee used a “mocking and
sarcastic tone” but that such tone did not rise to the level as to “deprive the activity of the
protection of the Act.”67
While, in theory, it may possible for an employee to lose the protections of the NLRA
through necessary disparagement, in practice, the General Counsel has actually allowed the

63

Id. (internal quotations omitted.)
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id. (quoting Allied Aviation Service Company of New Jersey, Inc., 248 NLRB 229, 231 (1980)).
67
Id.
64
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Facebook comments to go quite far.68 In the AMR Adv. Mem., the General Counsel stated that a
Facebook conversation in which an employee called her supervisor a “dick” and a “scumbag”
did not raise to the level of disparagement that would lose the protection of the act. Specifically,
the AMR Adv. Mem. looked at four factors to determine when an employee, while engaging in
protected activity “has by opprobrious conduct lost the protection of the Act: (1) the place of the
discussion; (2) the subject matter of the discussion; (3) the nature of the employee’s outburst;
and (4) whether the outburst was, in any way, provoked by an employer’s unfair labor
practice.”69 Here, despite the inappropriate language used by the employee, the Office of the
General Counsel held that, “the name-calling was not accompanied by any verbal or physical
threats, and the Board has found more egregious name-calling protected.” The Office also took
into account the fact that the comments were made in an online forum, and multiple people,
including former co-workers engaged in conversation through Facebook.70
In advising a Region as to how to decide another Facebook case more similar to Knauz
Motors than to the AMR Adv. Mem., the Office of General Counsel for the NLRB issued an
opinion that mirrored the Knauz Motor analysis.71 The General Counsel was asked to issue
advice for the Region for a case in which an truck employee posted online, “[H]ow the hell are
you suppose to call in to your company dispatch and tell them anything when no one is there and
the phone were not forwarded…Well if Im [sic] or any other drive for our company is late it will
68

See Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Jonathan B.
Kreisberg, Regional Director of Region 34, American Medical Response of Connecticut, Inc.,
No. 34-CA-12576 at 9 (Oct. 5, 2010) [hereinafter AMR Adv. Mem.], available at http://
mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d458055b9c4; see also Complaint and Notice of
Hearing, Am. Med. Response of Conn., Inc., No. 34-CA-12576 (N.L.R.B.G.C. Oct. 27, 2010)
69
Id. at 9.
70
Id. at 9-10.
71
See Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Jane North, Acting
Regional Director Region 11, Buel, No. 11-CA-22936, 2011 WL 3793671 (N.L.R.B.G.C. July
28, 2011).
15

be your fault for not properly forwarding the phones on the call dispatch!”72 Despite the direct
reference to a problem and issue with his work, the General Counsel advised that no concerted
activity had occurred because the employee “did not discuss his Facebook posts with any of his
fellow employees and none of his coworkers responded to his complaints about work-related
matters… [and that] there is insufficient evidence that his Facebook activity was a continuation
of any collective concerns.” The General Counsel also found that the comment was more of an
expression of “his own frustration and boredom while stranded by the weather.”73 The General
Counsel reasoned that protected activity “includes ‘circumstances in which the employees seek
to initiate or to induce or to prepare for group action’ and where individual employees bring
‘truly group complaints’ to management’s attention.”74
What can be concluded from these two cases is that the NLRB has created a very factsensitive analysis for determining whether a social media update during off hours is a protected
activity under the NLRA. Despite the fact that in both cases the employees were discussing
issues they had with work, the Board and the General Counsel seem to find the actions of the
employees before they posted any comments online, and the connection to terms and conditions
of employment, to be the main determining factors in deciding the protected status of a comment.
Also relevant, was whether any other employee participated in the Facebook comments. Neither
case however, outlines or acknowledges the interests of the employer within the context of the
First Amendment.

72

Id. at *1.
Id. at *2.
74
Id.
73
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Another issue not addressed by the two cases discussed above but also relevant to
employee Facebook postings, is the issue of unlawful surveillance.75 In the MONOC advisory
opinion, the Regional Director addressed a nurse’s Facebook posting that, according to the
employer, were potential threats to withholding patient care.76 The employer became aware of
the Facebook postings by the nurse employee when another employee contacted upper
management about the online communications.77 The only individuals that were authorized to
see the nurse employee’s Facebook postings were authorized “friends,” which included some coemployees.78 The nurse employee alleged that the employer obtained the Facebook post through
employer monitoring of the employees actions, which would be a violation of Section 7 rights, or
rather, the right for employees to “feel free to participate in union activity ‘without the fear that
members of management are peering over their shoulders[.]’”79 The Regional Director stated
that such a violation occurs when “[a]n employer creates an impression of surveillance when ‘the
employee would reasonable assume from the [employer’s] statement that their [sic] union
activities had been placed under surveillance.”80
In the MONOC advisory opinion, the Regional Director announced that when an
employer finds or obtained Facebook postings through the voluntary actions of another employee,
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the findings would not constitute the impression of surveillance that would rise to a violation of
Section 7 rights.81
While the MONOC case did not find employer surveillance, the rule articulated by the
Regional Director did not address a scenario in which the employer forces an employee to
provide them with their Facebook passwords, or access to their Facebook pages. The MONOC
advisory opinion seems to suggest that such force, especially if the employer’s Facebook page
was extremely limited to a small audience, would constitute a violation of Section 7 activity as
unlawful surveillance.82

C. The Differences and Similarities Between the Private and Public Employment: Who
Protects Speech Better?
Private and public employees are both protected in what they say about their work on
their social media sites in different ways. The protection that each employee has is limited
dependent upon what laws applies to his or her employer. Analyzing a public employee’s
conduct on social media sites is different and similar than analyzing a private employee’s
conduct in five ways: 1. the public employee must take into account the public interest in his or
her statement, while the private employer must be wary to take action against their employees
interest in the terms and conditions of employment; 2. the public employee does not have to
examine how many people commented or participated in the discussion online for protection,
while the private employee should take into account whether other employees will respond to the
message; 3. both the courts and the Board draw distinctions between “frustrations” and true
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complaints by looking at the entirety of the statement at issue; 4. the potential surveillance issue
for both public and private employees; and 5. the courts balance the interest of the public
employer against the employees interest, whereas the Board does not take into account the
employer’s interest.
1. The Public Interest vs. The Employees Labor Interests
When analyzing free speech claims against employers by employees, the Supreme Court
remains cognizant of the public’s interest in public employee’s speech.83 In City of San Diego,
the Court articulated that “[u]nderlying the decision in Pickering is the recognition that public
employees are often the members of the community who are likely to have informed opinions as
to the operations of their public employers, operations that are of substantial concern to the
public.”84 The Court also states that “[t]he interest at stake is as much the public’s interest in
receiving informed opinion as it is the employee’s own right to disseminate it.” Additionally, in
McPherson, the Supreme Court looks towards the overarching principals of free speech, stating
that “[d]ebate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and… may well
include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
officials.”85
In the context of private employment, the Board does not look towards the public’s
interest in the free speech of private employees. Neither case addressing Facebook postings
without a social medial policy articulated a standard based on any interest of the public.
However, Knauz Motors addressed how difficult it would be to strip the protection of the
NLRA from actions deemed to be concerted for the purposes of the employees’ mutual aid or
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protection.86 The underlying rational in the Knauz case was not whether the public had an
interest in what the employee was saying, but rather, whether the statement made sought “to
initiate or to induce or to prepare for group action” for the purposes of the employees’ mutual aid
and protection, like wages or other benefits.87 The private employer, must remain wary of
comments made by their employees that affect all employees rights to engage in group activity,
where as the public employer should be cognizant as to whether an employee is speaking out
about an issue of public concern. However the standard for determining whether a public
employee is speaking as to a matter of public concern is anything but clear.88
2. The Number of Participants
How many comments one may get on a Facebook status or photo may make or break the
determination as to whether a comment will be protected under the NLRA.89 In the Buel
Advisory Opinion issued by the General Counsel of the NLRB, an employee’s Facebook
comment was not protected because “none of [the employee posting on Facebook’s] coworkers
responded to his complaints about work related matters. Although he had discussed the fact that
the on-call dispatcher was not reachable with other drivers, there is insufficient evidence that his
Facebook activity was a continuation of any collective concerns.”90 While other evidence may
have supported the conclusion that the activity was a “continuation of any collective concern,”
other employees commenting on a status could have supported a finding of a Section 8(a)(1)

86

Knauz Motors, 13-CA-4652, 2011 WL 4499437 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Sept. 28, 2011).
Id.
88
See Elizabeth J. Bohn, Put on Your Coat, A Chill Wind Blows: Embracing the Expansion of
the Adverse Employment Action Factor in Tenth Circuit First Amendment Retaliation Claims. 83
DENV. U. L. REV. 867, 869 (2006).
89
See Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Jane North, Acting
Regional Director Region 11, Buel, No. 11-CA-22936, 2011 WL 3793671, at *2 (N.L.R.B.G.C.
July 28, 2011).
90
Id.
87

20

violation by the charging party. While in Knauz Motors, the NLRB did not hold that the
comments on the Facebook page of the employee were dispositive, the employee at issue in that
case was friends with other coworkers and had even posted pictures of them at the events at issue
online.91
While the O’Brien court did acknowledge how many Facebook friends the public
employee had at issue, it was not related to whether the speech was of the type that could be
protected under the First Amendment, but rather, whether the speech adversely affected the
employer.92 In O’Brien, her potential issue was the opposite of the problem in the opinion issued
by the General Counsel for the NLRB. Her Facebook posts caused too much disruption, and was
a factor the court considered in supporting the school’s decision to fire her.93
Generally speaking, private employees, if they want to gain protection under the NLRA
for what they say on Facebook, should take into consideration the number of co-workers
participating in the online conversation where as public employees should be wary of how many
people, or “customers,” may have access to their statements.
3. The Context of the Statement
Both the NLRB and courts look towards the context of the statements at issue to
determine whether an employee is truly expressing a grievance or whether they are just taking
out their frustrations on Facebook. In the Buel Advisory Opinion issued by the General Counsel
of the NLRB, the Counsel reasoned that protection should not be extended to the employee at
91
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issue because he “plainly was not seeking to induce or prepare for group action. Instead, he was
simply expressing his own frustration and boredom while stranded by the weather, by griping
about his inability to reach the on-call dispatcher.”94 Similarly, a review of the NLRB cases that
have address charges similar to the one addressed by the General Counsel revolve around
statements of employees “griping about work and getting fired for it.”95
In the public employment context, workers must also worry about whether their
statements can be taken as actual “matters of public concern,” or just complaints about their
work. In O’Brien the court found that the comments the public employee made were not matters
of public concern so as to qualify for the protections of the First Amendment.96 There the court
found that the employee “took a legitimate issue of public concern and distorted [it] into a
vehicle to let her more than 300 Facebook ‘friends’ know she was having a bad time at work.”97
Both the NLRB and the O’Brien court looked towards the context of the statement by
examining the surrounding circumstances the employee was in when they wrote the comments to
determine whether they were venting frustration, or if they were truly engaging in protected
activity. In O’Brien the court examined the teacher’s testimony and found that she could not
establish that “she ardently wanted the public to know more about the correlation between
classroom behavior and academic performance.”98 Without such testimony, the court did not
conclude that the statements made online crossed the threshold of only speaking upon matters of
94
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personal interest, into matters of public concern.99 In the Buel Advisory Opinion issued by the
General Counsel, the court looked at what the employee was doing at the time he wrote the
Facebook status, and held that the employee was ultimately just frustrated about being out in the
cold, and therefore did not cross the threshold into “concerted” activity.100 If instead, the
employee attempted to use his own particular situation as a way to engage other co-workers into
convincing the employer to keep the employees out of the cold, then the General Counsel may
have found differently.
4. Surveillance
None of the cases addressing the First Amendment and public employment took issue
with the potential surveillance issues that can come up after an employer takes adverse actions
against an employees’ Facebook posting. However, in the private sector, employers should stay
conscious of the way they obtain their employees’ Facebook postings so as to be aware of the
potential violation of Section 7 rights. While the NLRB has yet to address a case that is different
than a supervisor obtaining a Facebook comment through another co-worker or through their
own access to an employee’s Facebook page, it is possible that the Board may find surveillance
to exist if other means are used to obtain an employee’s Facebook information.101
Another potential issue that surveillance brings up in the private employment context is
whether the General Counsel’s advisory opinions addressing the issue have opened the door to
chilling the labor rights of individuals. By finding that employers who have obtained Facebook
99
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information of one employee through another employee is not surveillance of an employee’s
Facebook, employees may be more inclined to restrict their postings to very few “friends”
thereby potentially causing an indirect chilling effect of Section 7 activity. While this is an issue
addressed in law review articles and in arguments made by employees who have been disciplined
by their employers, neither the NLRB or the General Counsel has yet to address this potential
chilling effect. However, such a concern may be raised in the future for private employers.102
5. The Employer’s Interest
In O’Brien, the court stated that the school environment was different because the
employee at issue “is responsible for nurturing young children, and must work in concert with
administrators, parents and the community at large to promote student success.”103 In other
public employment contexts, the court does not provide the same amount of deference to
employers when they fire employees.104 In McPherson the Supreme Court stated that when “an
employee serves no confidential, policymaking, or public contract role, the danger to the
agency’s successful functioning from that employee’s private speech is minimal.”105 McPherson
supports the proposition that, at least in the public employment context, where you work matters.
The NLRB does not, at least in the cases addressed so far, take into account the
employer’s interest in determining whether an employee’s speech is protected under the NLRA
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unless the employer has a social media policy and the employer is in the journalism industry. 106
Neither case that addressed social media comments where the employer did not articulate a
standard looked towards the employer’s interest in any way, and instead focused on the context
of the statement and the participants of the postings.

III. Conclusion
Both the private and public employment law surrounding the social media activities of
employees has its pros and cons from an employees’ perspective. Both legal analyses do not give
clear guidance as to what employers should say in restricting employee conduct, and neither give
any bright line rules regarding employee actions. Equally murky are the definitions of “public
concern” and “mutual aid and protection” that do not provide much guidance as to what types of
statements are actually protected under the applicable laws and constitutional provisions. For
public employees, where they work makes a large difference in the restrictions placed upon them.
For private employees, the interactions that they have with their coworkers about the terms and
conditions of their employment matter as to whether or not a statement about work can be
protected. So, for Facebook-active employees deciding whether the public or private
employment sphere would protect them against adverse employment actions, there is no clear
winner in who protects the interest of employees better, the First Amendment or the NLRA.
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